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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Katherine Taylor brought suit under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq., 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 
Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 951 et seq., alleging that her former 
employer, the Phoenixville School District, failed to provide 
her reasonable accommodations for her mental illness. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the school 
district, reasoning that Taylor's mental illness, bipolar 
disorder, or manic depression as it is sometimes called, did 
not qualify as a disability under the ADA. Alternatively, the 
District Court held that even if Taylor did have a disability, 
the only accommodation she specifically requested, transfer 
to another position, was not possible and, consequently, 
she was not an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability. We will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I 
 
Before she was terminated on October 28, 1994, 
Katherine Taylor had worked for twenty years as the 
principal's secretary at the East Pikeland Elementary 
School in the Phoenixville School District. Prior to the fall 
of 1993, Taylor had not received a single disciplinary notice 
from any of the various principals she worked with over the 
years, and when formal evaluations were instituted in the 
1991-92 school year, she received high praise. 
 
Trouble began after Taylor suffered the onset of bipolar 
disorder in late August of 1993, regrettably during the first 
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full week that a new principal, Christine Menzel, assumed 
her duties at East Pikeland. While Taylor was at work 
during that week, she began acting strangely, alarming 
Menzel and Linda Ferrara, the school district's 
administrative assistant for personnel. Menzel and Ferrara 
were so disturbed by Taylor's behavior that they doubted 
Taylor's capacity to leave on a train by herself and had 
someone at the school district contact Taylor's son, Mark 
Taylor. He soon drove his mother to Coastal Plain Hospital, 
a psychiatric institution in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, 
where she was admitted as an in-patient on August 31, 
1993. 
 
Hospital records indicate that Taylor had become manic 
and was increasingly agitated and psychotic. According to 
the records, Taylor hid herself at the train station, believing 
that someone was after her, and tried to disguise herself by 
covering her head with a scarf. On the car ride from 
Pennsylvania to the hospital, she was delusional and 
announced that the car was being escorted by state 
troopers and helicopters. She also claimed that her son's 
boss was after him and that there were many people on the 
highway who were "firefighters" who were trying to protect 
her. The hospital report noted that Taylor did not have any 
insight into the severity of her condition and believed she 
was being admitted due to "acute stress." The school 
district's own expert, Dr. Rieger, agreed that during Taylor's 
hospitalization, she "clearly had paranoid delusions" and 
was hyperactive and psychotic. 
 
Taylor was treated by two psychiatrists at the hospital 
who diagnosed her illness as bipolar disorder and treated 
her with lithium carbonate and an antipsychotic drug, 
Navane, when lithium alone was insufficient. Once Taylor's 
symptoms were brought under control by the combination 
of drugs, she was discharged on September 20, 1993, and 
her care was taken over by Dr. Louise Sonnenberg, a 
psychiatrist in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. Since her 
discharge from the hospital, Taylor has continued to take 
lithium, see Dr. Sonnenberg, and receive the necessary, 
periodic blood tests.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. One widely-used text explains that: "Because lithium has an extremely 
narrow therapeutic range, blood levels of the drug must be closely 
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Taylor's son stated in an affidavit that during his 
mother's leave of absence, he had numerous phone 
conversations with Ferrara in which he explained that his 
mother would be absent from work because she had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and required 
hospitalization. Mark Taylor also asserted in his affidavit 
that during a phone call on October 8, one week before Ms. 
Taylor resumed working, he told Ferrara that due to Ms. 
Taylor's bipolar disorder, she "would require 
accommodations when she returned to work." The affidavit 
adds that he provided Ferrara with the information he 
received from his mother's doctors "including diagnosis and 
treatment information and medications." Coastal Plain 
Hospital itself sent a letter to the school district on 
September 13, 1993, identifying one of Taylor's physicians 
and providing a phone number to address any additional 
questions the school district might have. 
 
According to Taylor, Ferrara did eventually contact one of 
her treating physicians. Ferrara's own handwritten notes 
show that she attempted to obtain copies of Taylor's 
records from Coastal Plain Hospital and planned to speak 
to at least one of Taylor's doctors. The school district had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
monitored. The occurrence and intensity of side effects are, in most 
cases, directly related to plasma concentrations of lithium... The main 
toxic effects involve the gastrointestinal tract, the kidneys, the 
thyroid, 
the cardiovascular system, the skin, and the nervous system." Robert M. 
Julien, A Primer of Drug Action, 8th ed., W.H. Freeman & Co., at 229-30 
(1998). The Physicians' Desk Reference, 53rd ed., Medical Economics 
Co., at 2750 (1999) likewise states that: "Lithium toxicity is closely 
related to serum lithium levels and can occur at doses close to 
therapeutic levels." Both authorities state that when the amount of 
lithium in the blood is near and above the therapeutic range, side effects 
can include nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, slight tremor, lethargy, 
impaired concentration, dizziness, slurred speech, ataxia, muscle 
weakness, and nystagmus. Julien adds that memory problems and 
weight gain are also frequent complaints with continued treatment. As 
plasma levels rise higher, toxic effects include muscle rigidity, coma, 
renal failure, cardiac arrhythmias, and death. Blood levels can fluctuate 
for a variety of reasons. For example, Julien notes that "when a patient 
lowers his or her salt intake or loses excessive amounts of salt (such as 
through sweating), lithium blood levels rise and intoxication may 
inadvertently follow." Id. at 228. 
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other contact with Taylor's doctors because before Taylor 
was permitted to return to work, the school district 
required her to submit a note from Dr. Sonnenberg saying 
that Taylor was no longer disabled. Even prior to Mark 
Taylor's October 8th phone call, Ferrara sent a letter to the 
school district's superintendent which stated that: 
 
       Mrs. Taylor has been released from the Coastal Plain 
       Hospital in North Carolina and her son will be picking 
       her up this coming weekend to bring her back to 
       Pennsylvania. She will be receiving out-patient care in 
       Phoenixville through the Phoenixville Psychiatric 
       Associates. They will monitor her Blood Lithium [sic] 
       levels. It was stressed that she must maintain and 
       continue her medication. He felt, as well as the doctor, 
       that the first week should be easing her transition back 
       into the work place. 
 
App. vol. I at 80. 
 
A notation on the letter indicates that a copy was 
forwarded to Menzel. However, Menzel has submitted an 
affidavit denying that she saw the memo and asserting that: 
"I did not learn the specifics of the Plaintiff's alleged 
condition (i.e., bipolar disorder) until after reading a 
newspaper article describing her filing of the current 
lawsuit." App. vol. II at 2. Ferrara has also submitted an 
affidavit asserting that "at no time was I or anyone else at 
the School District aware of Plaintiff's alleged diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder or the details or frequency of any 
treatments she may have been receiving after returning 
from Coastal Plain until after the current lawsuit was filed." 
App. vol. II at 50. 
 
After Taylor provided the note from Dr. Sonnenberg, she 
resumed work on October 15, 1993 although, as Ferrara's 
letter indicated, Taylor was only authorized to work half 
days for the first week. Prior to her hospitalization, Taylor 
had received high praise for her performance. In June of 
1993, about two months before Taylor's hospitalization, the 
outgoing principal, Dr. Herron, wrote that Taylor"excels in 
all aspects" of her job, was a "credit to our school," and "a 
tribute to excellence." App. vol. I at 86. In a subsequent 
letter of recommendation, Dr. Herron again praised Taylor's 
performance without reservation and stated that: 
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       As a secretary, Mrs. Taylor served me and the entire 
       school family exceeding[ly] well... I felt comfortable in 
       leaving the building, sometimes for an extended 
       amount of time, because of Mrs. Taylor's skills. Indeed, 
       at such times, Mrs. Taylor carried on the full functions 
       of the school as if she herself was capable of running 
       the functions of the building without supervision, and, 
       indeed, in such cases, she was entirely capable of 
       doing so. 
 
App. vol. I at 87. 
 
Almost immediately upon Taylor's return to work, 
Menzel, following Ferrara's advice, began documenting 
errors Taylor committed. The errors were then compiled 
into a bullet-format list, the list was presented to Taylor, 
and soon thereafter Menzel and Ferrara would call Taylor 
into a disciplinary meeting and offer her a chance to rebut 
the charges. A representative from Taylor's union also 
attended although it is unclear to what extent the 
representative participated. 
 
Taylor's first disciplinary notice, dated November 9, 1993, 
listed errors as early as October 19, 1993, only four days 
after Taylor's return to work and while she was still 
working part time. Eight more disciplinary notices followed, 
dated 11/23/93, 12/9/93, 1/6/94, 2/1/94, 3/11/94, 
4/22/94, 9/2/94, and 10/27/94, the last arriving shortly 
before Taylor was terminated. Over the course of the 
disciplinary meetings, Taylor disputed some charges and 
tried to explain others, but as 1994 wore on, Menzel 
documented many errors that Taylor did not contest, and 
the interpersonal friction between Menzel and Taylor 
continued unabated. Disciplinary notices during this period 
list problems such as missed deadlines, mishandling of 
records, typing errors, interpersonal conflicts, and 
undelivered messages. 
 
Part of Taylor's complaint about her treatment is that 
Menzel often did not speak to her informally and in-person 
about problems as they arose. Instead, Taylor alleges that 
Menzel documented every misstep, saved letters containing 
typos, photographed Taylor's desk and trash can, as well as 
the inside of the office refrigerator, and waited to confront 
Taylor with the evidence in the disciplinary meetings. 
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Taylor also objects that the school district made her job 
more difficult upon her return from the hospital. First, 
during Taylor's absence, Menzel instituted a number of 
changes in the office: she introduced new office policies, 
created new forms, relocated documents, rearranged 
furniture, threw out Taylor's old filing system, and 
discarded files, including some in Taylor's desk. Taylor 
claims that these changes were disorienting and made it 
much more difficult to accomplish tasks she could easily 
perform before the hospitalization. Of course, Taylor's 
absence coincided with the first weeks Menzel served as 
principal, and thus changes were inevitable and part of 
Menzel's prerogative as a new principal. The gravamen of 
Taylor's complaint, however, focuses on the abrupt, 
seemingly hostile manner in which the changes were made. 
 
Compounding Taylor's difficulties, a new computer 
system was introduced to keep track of student records and 
other data. The school district points out that plans to 
introduce the computers had been underway prior to 
Taylor's hospitalization, and according to an affidavit 
submitted by a school-district employee, Taylor had more 
difficulty than the other secretaries at a training session 
conducted in July of 1993. Taylor does not appear to 
dispute that the school district was entitled to switch to 
computers; rather, the thrust of her objection seems to be 
that the school district raised another hurdle by the 
manner in which the new system was introduced when she 
returned from her hospitalization. 
 
Taylor claims that her job was made more difficult in 
another, more straightforward way: Following her return, 
her job description was changed, increasing the number of 
her job responsibilities from 23 to 42. It is not clear from 
the record when these changes were made, how substantial 
they were, or to what extent the new list simply enumerated 
in greater detail duties she already performed, but reading 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Taylor, there is 
reason to believe that the new list added significant 
responsibilities and made her return more difficult. 
 
On September 2, 1994 Taylor received a notice placing 
her on probation for 30 days and informing her that if her 
performance did not improve, she would be terminated. She 
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was in fact discharged on October 28, 1994 although 
Taylor's union representative subsequently negotiated with 
the school district to allow Taylor to "retire" and receive 
some retirement benefits. Since her termination, Taylor has 
applied at different times for unemployment benefits and 
disability benefits. 
 
II 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Taylor's ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over Taylor's state-law claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of a 
district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d 
Cir. 1996). In evaluating the school district's motion for 
summary judgment, we must determine whether there are 
any genuine disputes of material fact, and if not, then 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we must decide whether the school district was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56; Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11 
(1986). 
 
III 
 
A. Basic statutory framework 
 
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from 
discriminating "against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a). A 
"qualified individual with a disability" is defined by the ADA 
as a person "with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual 
holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8). A"disability" is 
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defined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12102(2). 
 
In view of the foregoing definitions, we have held that in 
order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show: "(1) 
he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) 
he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions 
of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by 
the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse 
employment decision as a result of discrimination." Gaul v. 
Lucent Technologies, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing, Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
Discrimination under the ADA encompasses not only 
adverse actions motivated by prejudice and fear of 
disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable 
accommodations of disabilities. The ADA specifies that an 
employer discriminates against a qualified individual with a 
disability when the employer does "not mak[e] reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of the individual unless the [employer] can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of the 
[employer]." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 
Before turning to the first issue, whether Taylor has a 
disability under the ADA, we mention that we will only 
discuss Taylor's ADA claim because our analysis of an ADA 
claim applies equally to a PHRA claim. Kelly v. Drexel 
University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
B. Does Taylor have a disability under the ADA? 
 
As set forth above, Taylor can establish that she has a 
disability if she has a mental impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity, has a record of such an 
impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 
42 U.S.C. S 12102(2). Taylor argues that she can satisfy 
each of these standards, but because we conclude that she 
has a mental impairment that substantially limits a major 
life activity, we need not reach the other two grounds. 
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No one disputes that bipolar disorder counts as a mental 
impairment under the ADA. The ADA's regulations define a 
"physical or mental impairment" as including "[a]ny mental 
or psychological disorder, such as... emotional or mental 
illness..." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(h)(2). While the District Court 
agreed that bipolar disorder clearly qualifies as a "mental 
impairment," the District Court nonetheless concluded that 
Taylor's impairment did not substantially limit one of her 
major life activities. Our analysis therefore begins with the 
definitions for "substantially limits" and"major life 
activities." 
 
While we have observed that "[t]he ADA does not define 
`major life activities,' " Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105 (citation 
omitted), the ADA's regulations provide a nonexhaustive list 
of major life activities that includes "functions such as 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(i). 
 
According to the ADA's regulations, an impairment 
"substantially limits" a major life activity when the person 
is either: "(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the 
average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) 
Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a 
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same major life 
activity." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1). The regulations list the 
following factors to use in evaluating when someone is 
substantially limited in a major life activity:"(1) The nature 
and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or 
expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The 
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent 
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2). A separate analysis is applied 
under the regulations to determine when the major life 
activity of working is substantially limited, see 
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778 (3d 
Cir. 1998); 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3), but since we find 
Taylor's illness affected major life activities even more 
fundamental than working, we need not analyze her 
disorder's impact on her ability to work. 
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When someone must be confined to a hospital because 
she is psychotic, increasingly agitated, and gripped by 
delusions, it is manifest that her abilities to think, care for 
herself, concentrate, and interact with others are 
substantially limited. As Taylor's records from Coastal Plain 
Hospital document, before Taylor was treated with lithium 
and an antipsychotic drug, she suffered paranoid delusions 
that people were trying to kill her, inducing her to disguise 
herself at the train station. On the car ride, she thought her 
son's life was in danger, believed that the highway patrol 
was escorting her, and thought the highway was filled with 
"firefighters" there to protect her. Unable to recognize that 
these beliefs were baseless, she explained at the time of her 
admission that she was there for "acute stress." Symptoms 
like these constitute severe limitations in a person's ability 
to think. 
 
We have previously held that disabilities should be 
evaluated based on the plaintiff's unmedicated state. 
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 
933 (3d Cir. 1997). In Matczak we explained that according 
to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's (EEOC) interpretive guidelines, whether an 
impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity 
should be evaluated "without regard to mitigating measures 
such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." Id. at 
937 (quoting 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.2(j) at 348). 
We recognized that although the EEOC's interpretive 
guidelines are not entitled to the same degree of deference 
as regulations, we give the EEOC's interpretations"a great 
deal of deference since Congress charged the EEOC with 
issuing regulations to implement the ADA." Id. We added 
that "we must give the EEOC's interpretation of its own 
regulations `controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation[s].' " Id. (quoting, Thomas 
Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 
S.Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994)). 
 
Legislative history reinforces the EEOC's position and 
shows that Congress intended mitigating measures to be 
excluded from the evaluation of when an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity: "[P]ersons with 
impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which 
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substantially limit a major life activity are covered under 
the first prong of disability, even if the effects of the 
impairment are controlled by medication." Id. (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 52 (1990), reprinted in  1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 334) See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 28 
(1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 451; S.Rep. No. 101- 
116, at 23 (1989). 
 
We recognize that the Tenth Circuit has rejected this view 
and held that disabilities should be evaluated based on 
their mitigated state. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 
790 (Jan. 8, 1999). And we are aware that the Supreme 
Court has decided to review Sutton along with two similar 
cases. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 141 F.3d 1185 
(10th Cir. 1998)(unpublished table decision), cert. granted, 
119 S.Ct. 790 (Jan. 8, 1999); Kirkingburg v. Albertson's 
Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 
791 (Jan. 8, 1999). Nonetheless, we remain firm in our 
belief that legislative history and deference to the 
administering agency require the rule announced in 
Matczak, and we are, of course, bound by our prior 
precedent. We would add that the majority of circuits which 
have considered the issue have held that disabilities should 
be judged based on their unmitigated state. See Arnold v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 857-866 (1st Cir. 
1998); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 
(7th Cir. 1995); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 
627-28 (8th Cir. 1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 
F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); Harris v. H & W Contracting 
Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996); but see 
Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 
464 (5th Cir. 1998)(only "serious impairments" like 
diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing impairments will be 
assessed in their unmitigated state; permanent corrections 
will be evaluated based on the mitigated condition); Gilday 
v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 
1997)(Kennedy, J., concurring in part); id. at 768 (Guy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)("impact of 
mitigating measures must be decided on a case-by-case 
basis"). Except for the Tenth Circuit, even those circuits 
rejecting the EEOC's rule have allowed that serious 
conditions, which we believe Taylor's illness is, should be 
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judged based on their unmitigated state. As the First 
Circuit pointed out in Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861, it makes 
little sense to insist that serious, chronic conditions like 
diabetes, epilepsy, or bipolar disorder cannot be disabilities 
unless they are so poorly controlled that it becomes all but 
inevitable that no reasonable accommodation is possible.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Employers need not fear that discounting mitigating factors will 
establish a flood of new-found disabilities and demands for 
accommodations. First, many widely-treated conditions simply do not 
significantly restrict a person's functioning as compared to the average 
person's - even when those conditions are left untreated. If, on the other 
hand, a condition is disabling when untreated, but really is fully 
corrected by mitigating measures, then it is very unlikely that employers 
will need to make much in the way of accommodations, for by 
hypothesis, the condition imposes no restrictions on the employee. 
 
The value of looking to the unmitigated condition is that it allows the 
ADA to encompass serious, chronic conditions like diabetes or bipolar 
disorder that, while capable of being controlled by medication, are not 
always perfectly controlled. Medical treatments for many chronic 
conditions can in some instances themselves create limitations. See, e.g., 
supra note 1. The problem with insisting that these uncontrolled 
symptoms must themselves be substantially limiting before 
accommodations are required is that once the symptoms of a serious, 
chronic condition are no longer kept in check, they can rapidly become 
totally disabling. As a result, employees with these disabilities would be 
denied the right to accommodations when modest accommodations could 
help them surmount significant although not substantially limiting 
symptoms. And "disability" status would only be achieved when their 
health had deteriorated so precipitously that no reasonable 
accommodation was possible. To take Taylor's case, she would not be 
legally entitled under the ADA to even the most simple accommodations 
for blood tests until she experienced the onset of another manic episode 
which could easily result in her becoming psychotic, requiring another 
commitment to an institution. 
 
It might be thought that those who have serious, chronic conditions 
can turn to the "regarded as disabled" prong to establish a disability and 
obtain accommodations when symptoms or the side effects of treatments 
flare. However, aside from the fact that an employer may not regard the 
employee as disabled, it remains an open question in this circuit 
whether employees are entitled to accommodations if they can only 
satisfy the "regarded as" prong for demonstrating a disability. See Deane 
v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1998)(en banc). 
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The District Court concluded that Taylor was not 
disabled because she failed to show that her bipolar 
disorder was more than a temporary condition. Closely 
related to this point was the District Court's alternative 
statement that Taylor did not suffer a disability at the time 
the adverse employment decision was made, i.e., on the 
District Court's view, the date of her termination. 
 
Concerning the District Court's second statement, we 
want to clarify that Taylor alleges the school district refused 
to accommodate her throughout the period starting 
immediately after she returned to work from the hospital 
and continuing until the date of her termination. Thus, the 
proper inquiry is whether Taylor was disabled during the 
period she says she sought and was denied reasonable 
accommodations. We do not narrow the inquiry and ask 
only whether Taylor was psychotic or had some 
uncontrolled symptoms of her bipolar disorder on the 
specific day she was terminated, for that would vitiate the 
rule that a disability controlled by medication is still a 
disability and would ignore the fact that the alleged failure 
to accommodate began before the termination. 
 
The District Court's position properly understood seems 
to be that Taylor failed to prove that her illness continued 
beyond the date of her discharge from Coastal Plain, and 
therefore, the school district was not required to 
accommodate a disability that no longer existed. The 
trouble with this view is that Taylor provided ample 
evidence that her disability has continued since the date of 
her hospitalization.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have previously held that some temporary impairments will not 
qualify as disabilities under the ADA even during the time the 
impairment actively affects the individual. McDonald v. Com. of Pa., Dept. 
of Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995). We explained in McDonald 
that the EEOC's guidelines provide that "temporary, nonchronic 
impairments of short duration, with little or no long term permanent 
impact, are usually not disabilities." Id.  at 95 (quoting 29 C.F.R. Pt. 
1630, App. S1630.2(j) at 347-48) We also reviewed the factors set forth 
in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2) for determining when an impairment 
"substantially limits" a major life activity: the impairment's nature and 
severity, its expected duration, and its long-term impact. Because we 
conclude that Taylor's condition was chronic and substantially limiting, 
we need not delve into the question of which acute conditions are 
excluded from the ADA's definition of a disability. 
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The District Court noted that Taylor's records from 
Coastal Plain Hospital did not discuss her prognosis after 
the discharge. The records only stated that at the time of 
discharge, Taylor was doing well, was "not overtly 
psychotic," and would be "followed by a psychiatrist of her 
choice in her home town." These statements certainly are 
not inconsistent with Taylor's having a chronic condition, 
and by indicating that her symptoms are currently under 
control and that she will receive further treatment, the 
records at least imply that the condition is ongoing. Other 
evidence before the District Court affirmatively 
demonstrated that Taylor has a continuing illness. Most 
obviously, Taylor has continued to take lithium and see a 
psychiatrist. Dr. Sonnenberg, Taylor's treating physician, 
stated that Taylor's bipolar disorder "is not cured but 
controlled with her medication" and "without the medicine 
Mrs. Taylor's symptoms are likely to be exhibited."4 
 
The District Court evidently refused to consider Dr. 
Sonnenberg's opinion because the Court said, citing Gaul v. 
AT&T, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.J. 1997), Taylor could 
not rely on the opinion of her own treating physician. But 
Gaul stated that "[i]t is well settled that treating physicians 
may testify as to any subject relevant to the evaluation and 
treatment of their patients." Id. at 349. At issue in Gaul was 
whether testimony by the plaintiff 's treating physician 
satisfied the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding that 
"expert medical testimony is required to establish the fact 
of the employee's [handicap]." Id. (quoting Clowes v. 
Terminex International, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597 (1988)). Just 
as the District Court in Gaul deemed admissible the 
opinion of a plaintiff 's treating physician, we hold that a 
plaintiff in an ADA case can rely on the testimony of his or 
her treating physician to demonstrate that the plaintiff has 
a disability. 
 
The District Court also cited the report of the school 
district's expert witness, Dr. Rieger. Dr. Rieger stated that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The DSM-IV states that: "Bipolar I Disorder is a recurrent disorder - 
more than 90% of the individuals who have a single Manic Episode go 
on to have future episodes." Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th Ed., American Psychiatric Association, at 353 (1994). 
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       There is no doubt in my mind that Ms. Taylor 
       experienced a biologic psychiatric illness in which 
       genetic factors play a role. These illnesses can appear 
       even fairly late in life regardless of life events and 
       stressors... 
 
       When I examined Ms. Taylor[,] she had a normal 
       mental state. Her chronic biological psychiatric illness 
       was obviously well controlled by medication. If she 
       continues to take her medications as instructed[,] she 
       will be able to work. She is now not at all disabled from 
       a psychiatric point of view... If she were somehow not 
       compliant with the medication[,] she might relapse into 
       psychosis and then might become disabled. 
       Theoretically there is a very small chance that she 
       could develop another psychotic break even while being 
       properly treated. 
 
App. vol. I at 157 and 159. 
 
The District Court placed great weight on the fact that 
Dr. Rieger said that Taylor "might relapse" if she ceased 
taking medication. Given that both parties' experts agree 
that Taylor's condition is chronic, we conclude that the 
District Court erred in reasoning that Taylor's condition 
could be temporary. We would add that Dr. Sonnenberg 
stated that without medication Taylor's symptoms "are 
likely to be exhibited," and nothing in Dr. Rieger's report 
suggests that it is likely Taylor would be fine without 
medication. When both parties' experts agree that the 
plaintiff's condition is chronic, both agree that the plaintiff 
could relapse without medication, and the plaintiff's 
treating physician has decided the risk of relapse is serious 
enough to warrant having the plaintiff continue taking a 
drug that imposes significant burdens, the plaintiff has 
established that her condition is not temporary. 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although the evidence cited above is sufficient for our holding, we 
note 
that a leading text on bipolar disorder states: "We wish to emphasize the 
common clinical belief that the great majority of bipolar patients 
withdrawn from lithium will eventually relapse. The wisdom of this 
assumption is reinforced by long-term follow-up studies... The Page 
study involved 101 bipolar and recurrent unipolar patients maintained 
on lithium for a median of 13 years. Of the 31 who stopped lithium, all 
but 2 suffered relapses, and those 2 were unipolar patients; that is, all 
bipolar patient who discontinued lithium relapsed." Frederick Goodwin 
and Kay Redfield Jamison, Manic-Depressive Illness, Oxford University 
Press, at 680-81 (1990). See also Julien, supra note 1, at 232. 
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We have previously held that a plaintiff with epilepsy, 
whose condition had been controlled for thirty years with 
medication, could still demonstrate that he had a disability. 
Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937-38. The likelihood of relapse was 
never an issue; it was simply assumed reasonably enough 
that if continuing drug treatment was medically indicated, 
the condition persisted. We would add that the EEOC has 
said chronic, episodic conditions can be substantially 
limiting, see 2 EEOC Compliance Manual, Enforcement 
Guidance for Psychiatric Disabilities, at 9 (March 25, 1997), 
and indeed, it seems reasonable to say that conditions that 
cause periodic, substantial shifts in a person's ability to 
function can be highly disabling. Many activities in life, and 
certainly most jobs, require a consistent level of 
functioning. A career interrupted by hospitalization, 
especially hospitalization punctuated by strange, 
embarrassing behavior, is not an easy one. 
 
Should our discussion above create any doubt, we want 
to emphasize that even once a plaintiff establishes that her 
condition persists or is chronic, the plaintiff still must 
show, as we specifically required in Matczak, 136 F.3d at 
938, that her persistent condition substantially limits a 
major life activity when left untreated. Not every chronic 
condition is a disability under the ADA. But as discussed 
above, Taylor has shown that the untreated symptoms of 
her chronic illness do substantially limit a number of her 
major life activities. The school district's own expert agreed 
that Taylor had bipolar disorder which caused "an acute 
psychotic break, necessitating hospitalization," and that 
Taylor "clearly had paranoid delusions" and was 
"hyperactive and euphoric" before and during her 
hospitalization. App. vol. I at 156 and 159. 
 
Because we find that the undisputed evidence in the 
record shows that Taylor had a disability, we believe that 
judgment should be entered in Taylor's favor on this issue. 
The school district had a full opportunity to present its side 
on this question, and both parties' experts agree on the 
essential facts. See Fabric v. Provident Life & Accident 
Insurance Co., 115 F.3d 908, 915 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 118 S.Ct. 1563 (1998)("Summary judgment in favor 
of a non-moving party has become an accepted method for 
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an appellate court to expedite litigation... [However,] [i]f a 
party did not have an opportunity to present his side of a 
dispute, granting summary judgment for a non-moving 
party would be improper.")(citations omitted). See also 10A. 
C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 3d S 2716 at 292-93 (1998). 
 
C. Reasonable accommodations 
 
Having concluded that Taylor was entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law that she has a disability under 42 U.S.C. 
S 12102(2)(A), we must consider whether the school district 
failed to provide reasonable accommodations. On this issue, 
we find that the District Court applied the wrong legal 
standards and that under the correct standard, disputes of 
material fact remain, requiring remand. 
 
As stated above, an employer commits unlawful 
discrimination under the ADA if the employer does"not 
mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical 
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
[the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business of [the employer]." 42 U.S.C.S 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 
In evaluating whether a plaintiff is a "qualified individual 
with a disability," we have held that a plaintiff must 
"satisf[y] the prerequisites for the position, such as 
possessing the appropriate educational background, 
employment experience, skills, licenses, etc." and, the 
plaintiff must be able to "perform the essential functions of 
the position held or desired, with or without reasonable 
accommodations." Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580 (quoting, 29 
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.2(m) at 351). Because Taylor 
held her position as secretary to the principal for many 
years, receiving high praise, there is no serious dispute that 
she satisfies the prerequisites for the position. The critical 
issue is whether Taylor could, with reasonable 
accommodations, perform the essential functions of her job 
following her return from her hospitalization. 
 
The Interactive Process 
 
The ADA's regulations state that: "To determine the 
appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary 
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for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process 
with the [employee] in need of accommodation. This process 
should identify the precise limitations resulting from the 
disability and the potential reasonable accommodations 
that could overcome those limitations." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(o)(3). Similarly, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines 
provide that: "Once a qualified individual with a disability 
has requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, 
the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine 
the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate 
reasonable accommodation is best determined through a 
flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer 
and the [employee] with a disability." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, 
App. S 1630.9 at 359. 
 
We have previously recognized both this regulation and 
the EEOC's interpretive guideline and applied them to a 
claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
S 701, et seq. Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 419-20 (3d 
Cir. 1997); see also Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 
F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998)(en banc).6  Based on the 
regulation and interpretive guidelines, we held in Mengine 
that "both parties have a duty to assist in the search for 
appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good 
faith." Id. We noted that other circuits have taken this view. 
See, e.g., Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 
F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)("A party that obstructs or 
delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith. A 
party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or 
response, may also be acting in bad faith."); Taylor v. 
Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 
1996)(The "employee's initial request for an 
accommodation... triggers the employer's obligation to 
participate in the interactive process..."). 
 
In Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 
F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996) an employee diagnosed with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. While Mengine involved a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
regulation and interpretive guidelines applied in the case were from the 
ADA. Furthermore, according to 42 U.S.C. S 12201(a), the ADA should 
not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the Rehabilitation Act. 
See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998). 
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paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder sought to 
return from an extended disability leave to his job as a 
custodian. His employer informed him that he would be 
reassigned to the largest school operated by Fort Wayne 
Community Schools, and added that he would not receive 
any special accommodation. The employer then instructed 
the plaintiff to take a physical and report to work or else he 
would be terminated. After touring the new school with the 
custodial foreman, the plaintiff told his employer that he 
did not think he was equal to the task but said he was not 
resigning. The plaintiff subsequently failed to take the 
physical or report to work although he did have his 
psychiatrist send a letter to the employer which stated that 
due to the plaintiff 's illness, it would be in the plaintiff 's 
best interest to work at a less stressful school. The 
employer never responded and terminated the plaintiff. The 
Seventh Circuit, reversing summary judgment for the 
employer, concluded that there was a genuine dispute as to 
whether the employer engaged in the interactive process of 
seeking accommodations. 
 
We agree with the Seventh Circuit which held that: 
 
       An employee's request for reasonable accommodation 
       requires a great deal of communication between the 
       employee and employer... [B]oth parties bear 
       responsibility for determining what accommodation is 
       necessary... `[N]either party should be able to cause a 
       breakdown in the process for the purpose of either 
       avoiding or inflicting liability. Rather, courts should 
       look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or 
       failure by one of the parties to help the other party 
       determine what specific accommodations are 
       necessary. A party that obstructs or delays the 
       interactive process is not acting in good faith. A party 
       that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or 
       response, may also be acting in bad faith. In essence, 
       courts should attempt to isolate the cause of the 
       breakdown and then assign responsibility.' 
 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Beck, 75 F.3d at 
1135). 
 
Our analysis of the interactive process in the present 
case is divided into two steps: first, we will clarify what 
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notice must be given to the employer to trigger the 
employer's obligations under the interactive process, and 
second, we will elaborate on the employee's and the 
employer's duties once the interactive process comes into 
play. 
 
1. Notice of the disability and request for ac commodation 
 
The first question we must address is who must make 
the request for accommodation and what form that request 
must take. The EEOC compliance manual provides that"a 
family member, friend, health professional, or other 
representative may request a reasonable accommodation on 
behalf of an individual with a disability." 2 EEOC 
Compliance Manual, Enforcement Guidance for Psychiatric 
Disabilities, at 20-21. Likewise, in Bultemeyer the Seventh 
Circuit allowed that an employee's psychiatrist could make 
a request for accommodations on behalf of an employee. 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1286. In our case, therefore, 
Taylor's son could make the initial request for 
accommodations. 
 
The EEOC's manual further provides that "[r]equests for 
reasonable accommodations do not need to be in writing," 
2 EEOC Compliance Manual, Enforcement Guidance for 
Psychiatric Disabilities, at 21, and "[t]o request 
accommodation, an individual may use `plain English' and 
need not mention the ADA or use the phrase `reasonable 
accommodation.' " Id. at 19. The Seventh Circuit said that 
"properly participating in the interactive process means 
that an employer cannot expect an employee to read its 
mind and know that he or she must specifically say`I want 
reasonable accommodation,' particularly when the 
employee has a mental illness." Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 
1286. 
 
The EEOC's manual makes clear, however, that while the 
notice does not have to be in writing, be made by the 
employee, or formally invoke the magic words "reasonable 
accommodation," the notice nonetheless must make clear 
that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability. 
In other words, the employer must know of both the 
disability and the employee's desire for accommodations for 
that disability. 
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These rules are consistent with the statute which says 
that the employer must make reasonable accommodations 
to an employee's "known" disability. 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(b)(5)(A). What matters under the ADA are not 
formalisms about the manner of the request, but whether 
the employee or a representative for the employee provides 
the employer with enough information that, under the 
circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of 
both the disability and desire for an accommodation. 
 
What information the employee's initial notice must 
include depends on what the employer knows. In Taylor v. 
Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996), 
an employee whose job performance had fallen off 
mentioned to his employer that he was diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder. Nothing the employee had done suggested 
the nature of his illness. When the employer, who said he 
did not know about the illness, asked the employee if he 
was okay, the employee responded that he was. The 
employee never offered further information about his 
disorder and, even more significantly, could not confirm 
that he ever explicitly asked for an accommodation or help 
of any sort. Under these circumstances, the employee has 
not been given sufficient notice to trigger the employer's 
duty to engage in the interactive process. Cf. Crandall v. 
Paralyzed Veterans of America, 146 F.3d 894 (D.C. Cir. 
1998)(Employee with bipolar disorder could not state a 
claim under the Rehabilitation Act when he never told his 
employer of his mental illness and never requested 
accommodations.). Employers cannot assume employees 
are disabled and need accommodations. 
 
Our case differs markedly. It is undisputed that Taylor 
became psychotic at work, that the school district knew she 
was hospitalized immediately thereafter, and that Coastal 
Plain Hospital contacted the school district by letter about 
Taylor's hospitalization and provided a phone number to 
answer questions. It is also undisputed that Ferrara wrote 
a note saying she planned to contact Taylor's doctors and 
that she wrote a letter to the superintendent, stating that 
"Phoenixville Psychiatric Associates... will monitor [Taylor's] 
Blood Lithium [sic] levels. It was stressed that she must 
maintain and continue her medication." The school district 
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also does not deny that it required Taylor to submit a note 
from Dr. Sonnenberg, further demonstrating that the school 
district knew how to get information from Taylor when it 
deemed it necessary. 
 
Based on this evidence, the school district had more than 
enough information to put it on notice that Taylor might 
have a disability, and therefore, in order to trigger the 
school district's obligation to participate in the interactive 
process, Taylor or her representative only needed to request 
accommodation. In light of the undisputed background 
information putting the school district on notice that Taylor 
had recently developed a serious disability, we think it 
would be especially inappropriate to insist that Taylor's son 
must have specifically invoked the ADA or used the words 
"reasonable accommodation" when he requested 
accommodations. Under the circumstances, it hardly 
should have come as a surprise that Taylor would want 
some accommodations, particularly as the successive 
disciplinary meetings began to mount for an employee who 
had previously performed very well. We would add that the 
school district had ample time to seek legal advice on its 
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations. 
Regardless, Taylor's son has submitted an affidavit saying 
that not only did he provide diagnostic and treatment 
information to the school district, he also asked for 
"accommodations" for his mother. 
 
Menzel's affidavit asserts that she did not "learn the 
specifics" of Taylor's disorder until after this litigation was 
started. Ferrara's affidavit states that: "To my knowledge, at 
no time was I or anyone else at the School District aware 
of Plaintiff 's alleged diagnosis of bipolar disorder or the 
details or frequency of any treatments she may have been 
receiving after returning from Coastal Plain until after the 
current lawsuit was filed." 
 
We want to make clear that the school district's duty to 
participate in the interactive process is triggered if Taylor 
notified either Menzel who was Taylor's supervisor and East 
Pikeland's principal, or Ferrara, the school district's 
administrative assistant for personnel. Thus, if Taylor's son 
requested accommodations from Ferrara, then the school 
district would have a duty to participate in the interactive 
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process regardless of how much Menzel knew about 
Taylor's disorder. 
 
We would add that to trigger the school district's duty to 
participate in the interactive process, it is not essential that 
Ferrara or Taylor knew the specific name of Taylor's 
condition although Taylor's son has created a factual 
dispute on this issue by saying that he provided Ferrara 
with diagnostic and treatment information. Suffice it to say 
that there is no genuine dispute that the school district was 
aware that Taylor exhibited serious psychiatric problems 
and those problems were severe enough to require her to be 
hospitalized for roughly three weeks. Following Taylor's 
discharge from the hospital, the school district knew that 
Phoenixville Psychiatric Associates monitored the lithium 
Taylor was taking and that Taylor continued to see a 
psychiatrist. Taylor also provided the school district with a 
number of avenues for obtaining further information from 
her doctors, avenues that the school district used. If there 
was any further information that the school district felt it 
needed to justify an accommodation, it was incumbent on 
the school district to ask for it. As the Seventh Circuit has 
said, "[t]he employer has to meet the employee half-way." 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285. To raise the bar for 
triggering the interactive process any further would 
essentially nullify the process. 
 
Once the employer knows of the disability and the 
employee's desire for accommodations, it makes sense to 
place the burden on the employer to request additional 
information that the employer believes it needs. Disabled 
employees, especially those with psychiatric disabilities, 
may have good reasons for not wanting to reveal 
unnecessarily every detail of their medical records because 
much of the information may be irrelevant to identifying 
and justifying accommodations, could be embarrassing, 
and might actually exacerbate workplace prejudice. An 
employer does not need to know the intimate details of a 
bipolar employee's marital life, for example, in order to 
identify or justify an accommodation such as a temporary 
transfer to a less demanding position. 
 
Another reason for placing some burden on the employer 
is that, as the Seventh Circuit recognized in Bultemeyer, an 
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employee with a mental illness may have difficulty 
effectively relaying medical information about his or her 
condition, particularly when the symptoms are flaring and 
reasonable accommodations are needed. Id. See also Criado 
v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1998)(When an 
employer terminated an employee with a mental illness due 
to an alleged miscommunication over a leave of absence, a 
jury could find that the employer failed to live up to its 
responsibility to help find accommodations.). It is worth 
noting that Taylor's hospital records specifically stated that 
at the time of her hospitalization, she "lacked insight" into 
her condition and believed her only problem was"acute 
stress." 
 
2. Application of the interactive process foll owing adequate 
       notice 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Taylor, 
we believe that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on 
the evidence presented thus far, that the school district did 
not meet its burden under the interactive process. Taylor's 
version of the case can be stated succinctly as follows: After 
Menzel and Ferrara watched Taylor become manic and 
require hospitalization, the two decided that Menzel should 
begin documenting Taylor's every error within days of her 
return, despite the fact that Taylor's son requested 
accommodations, informed them about Taylor's condition, 
and provided them with the means to obtain more 
information if needed. Notwithstanding Taylor's previous 
twenty years of strong performance and the school district's 
clear notice of Taylor's disability and desire for 
accommodations, the school district offered no 
accommodations or assistance in finding them, made 
Taylor's job more difficult, and simply sat back and 
continued to document her failures. A reasonable jury 
could conclude that the school district did not engage in an 
interactive process of seeking accommodations and is 
responsible for the breakdown in the process. 
 
The school district emphasizes that the only 
accommodation Taylor specifically requested was transfer 
to another position, which Taylor later conceded was not 
feasible. We do not think that it is fatal to Taylor's claim 
that her son did not request a specific accommodation or 
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that Taylor's request in March of 1994 was for an 
accommodation that she admitted was not possible. The 
interactive process, as its name implies, requires the 
employer to take some initiative. In Bultemeyer , the court 
explained that: "If the note [from the psychiatrist requesting 
accommodation] was too ambiguous and [the employer] did 
not know what Bultemeyer wanted, [the employer] easily 
could have called [the psychiatrist] for a clarification." 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285. The interactive process 
would have little meaning if it was interpreted to allow 
employers, in the face of a request for accommodation, 
simply to sit back passively, offer nothing, and then, in 
post-termination litigation, try to knock down every specific 
accommodation as too burdensome. That's not the 
proactive process intended: it does not help avoid litigation 
by bringing the parties to a negotiated settlement, 7 and it 
unfairly exploits the employee's comparative lack of 
information about what accommodations the employer 
might allow. In addition, in some cases courts may be 
better positioned to judge whether the employer met with 
the employee in good faith than to judge how burdensome 
a particular accommodation really is. 
 
The ADA's regulations make clear that the purpose of the 
interactive process is to determine the appropriate 
accommodations: "This process should identify the precise 
limitations resulting from the disability and the potential 
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those 
limitations." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(3). Therefore, it would 
make little sense to insist that the employee must have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In Deane we emphasized the value of the interactive process for 
avoiding litigation: "we take this opportunity to observe that this 
protracted (and very much ongoing) litigation would likely have been 
unnecessary had the parties taken seriously the precepts announced in 
our opinion in Mengine." Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 (citation omitted). We 
would add that the interactive process can be thought of as a less 
formal, less costly form of mediation. See 67 U.S.L.W. 2255 (noting the 
value of mediated settlement in ADA cases). Mediated settlements, the 
article explains, are cheaper than litigation, can help preserve 
confidentiality, allow the employee to stay on the job, and avoid 
monetary damages for an employer's initially hostile responses to 
requests for accommodations. The interactive process achieves these 
same goals even more effectively. 
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arrived at the end product of the interactive process before 
the employer has a duty to participate in that process. The 
EEOC's interpretive guidelines squarely place some of the 
burden on the employer by stating that "the employer must 
make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate 
accommodation." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.9 at 359. 
 
As we explained in Mengine, the process must be 
interactive because each party holds information the other 
does not have or cannot easily obtain. We noted that 
"employers will not always know what kind of work the 
worker with the disability can do, and conversely, the 
worker may not be aware of the range of available 
employment opportunities, especially in a large company. 
Thus, the interactive process may often lead to the 
identification of a suitable position." Mengine, 114 F.3d at 
420. More specifically, we explained that while an employee 
who wants a transfer to another position ultimately has the 
burden of showing that he or she can perform the essential 
functions of an open position, the employee does not have 
the burden of identifying open positions without the 
employer's assistance. "In many cases, an employee will not 
have the ability or resources to identify a vacant position 
absent participation by the employer." Mengine, 114 F.3d 
420.8 Taylor's concession that she knew of no other open 
positions, therefore, should not necessarily be the end of 
the matter if the school district made no effort to help 
investigate. 
 
When transfer is not sought, as was presumably the case 
when Taylor's son first requested accommodations, the 
employer likewise will often hold more information than the 
employee about what adjustments are feasible in the 
employee's current position. The Seventh Circuit pointed 
out in Bultemeyer that: "When Bultemeyer worked at North 
Side High School, a simple adjustment in his duties was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our opinion in Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 
1998) should be distinguished because there the employee's proposed 
accommodation, a transfer whenever he decided he was stressed, was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. If an employee insists on a single 
accommodation that is unreasonable as a matter of law, then the 
employee will be at fault for the breakdown in the interactive process. 
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enough of an accommodation to enable him to work there. 
But this time, we do not know what might have happened, 
because [the employer] was unwilling to engage in the 
interactive process and accommodation him." Bultemeyer, 
100 F.3d at 1285. 
 
In short, an employer who has received proper notice 
cannot escape its duty to engage in the interactive process 
simply because the employee did not come forward with a 
reasonable accommodation that would prevail in litigation. 
Participation is the obligation of both parties, however, so 
an employer cannot be faulted if after conferring with the 
employee to find possible accommodations, the employee 
then fails to supply information that the employer needs or 
does not answer the employer's request for more detailed 
proposals. And while a specific request may not always be 
necessary to initiate the process, it certainly helps bolster 
the employee's claim that the employer knew that the 
employee wanted accommodations. 
 
The interactive process does not dictate that any 
particular concession must be made by the employer; nor 
does the process remove the employee's burden of showing 
that a particular accommodation rejected by the employer 
would have made the employee qualified to perform the 
job's essential functions. See Walton v. Mental Health 
Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania, No. 97-2000, 
1999 WL 86818, at *8 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999). All the 
interactive process requires is that employers make a good- 
faith effort to seek accommodations. 
 
Employers can show their good faith in a number of 
ways, such as taking steps like the following: meet with the 
employee who requests an accommodation, request 
information about the condition and what limitations the 
employee has, ask the employee what he or she specifically 
wants, show some sign of having considered employee's 
request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when 
the request is too burdensome. These steps are consistent 
with the recommendations in the EEOC's interpretive 
guideline. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.S 1630.9 at 359-61. 
We do not think this process is especially burdensome. As 
we found in Mengine, the Postal Service engaged in good 
faith in the interactive process when it exchanged a number 
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of letters with an employee in an effort to identify a vacant 
position for reassignment and sent the employee multiple 
job descriptions of vacant positions. Mengine, 114 F.3d at 
421.9 
 
The school district can be understood as arguing 
implicitly that it did not have to participate in the 
interactive process because there was no feasible 
accommodation that would have made Taylor capable of 
performing the essential functions of her job. In Mengine we 
stated that "if reasonable accommodation is impossible, 
nothing more than communication of this fact is required. 
Nonetheless, if an employer fails to engage in the interactive 
process, it may not discover a way in which the employee's 
disability could have been reasonably accommodated, 
thereby risking violation of the Rehabilitation Act." Mengine, 
114 F.3d at 420-21. We explained that whether an 
employer's duty to participate in the interactive process has 
been discharged will often be a matter of "timing": i.e., the 
employer will almost always have to participate in the 
interactive process to some extent before it will be clear that 
it is impossible to find an accommodation that would allow 
the employee to perform the essential functions of a job. 
 
Put differently, because employers have a duty to help 
the disabled employee devise accommodations, an employer 
who acts in bad faith in the interactive process will be liable 
if the jury can reasonably conclude that the employee 
would have been able to perform the job with 
accommodations. In making that determination, the jury is 
entitled to bear in mind that had the employer participated 
in good faith, there may have been other, unmentioned 
possible accommodations. On the other hand, as we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Employers may find it useful to take advantage of the Job 
Accommodation Network although we do not in any way suggest that 
employers are obliged to make use of this service. The EEOC compliance 
manual explains that: "The Job Accommodation Network (JAN) provides 
advice free-of-charge to employers and employees contemplating 
reasonable accommodation. JAN is a service of the President's 
Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities which, in turn, is 
funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. JAN can be reached at 1-800- 
ADA-WORK." EEOC Compliance Manual, Enforcement Guidance for 
Psychiatric Disabilities, at 23, n. 56. 
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explained in Mengine, "[t]he ADA, as far as we are aware, is 
not intended to punish employers for behaving callously if, 
in fact, no accommodation for the employee's disability 
could reasonably have been made." Mengine, 114 F.3d at 
420 (quoting, Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 
(11th Cir. 1997)). 
 
When an employee has evidence that the employer did 
not act in good faith in the interactive process, however, we 
will not readily decide on summary judgment that 
accommodation was not possible and the employer's bad 
faith could have no effect. To assume that accommodation 
would fail regardless of the employer's bad faith would 
effectively eliminate the requirement that employers must 
participate in the interactive process. An employer who 
acted in bad faith would be in essentially the same, if not 
better, position than one who participated; that is, both 
employers would be arguing that the employee failed to find 
an accommodation making him or her able to perform the 
essential function of the job. The less the employer 
participated, the easier this would become, and as a result, 
the requirement that employers participate in the 
interactive process would be toothless. Thus, where there is 
a genuine dispute about whether the employer acted in 
good faith, summary judgment will typically be precluded. 
Cf. Hendrick-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 
1998)(Refusing to grant an employer summary judgment 
because it may not have participated in good faith in 
finding accommodations); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 
149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998)(Refusing to grant an employer 
summary judgment because disputes of fact remained 
about which party caused the breakdown in the interactive 
process).10 When the disability involved is one that is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Ninth Circuit has expressed disagreement with our decision in 
Mengine and concluded that employers are not obliged to participate in 
the interactive process. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 753 
(9th Cir. 1998). The majority in Barnett worried that an employer could 
be held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process even 
though 
the employee was successfully accommodated. We believe that where an 
employer has successfully made reasonable accommodations, a court 
can conclude as a matter of law that the employer did not act in bad 
faith. The Barnett majority also objected that it was not clear when an 
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heavily stigmatized in our society - as is true when the 
employee is voluntarily or involuntarily committed to a 
mental institution - courts should be especially wary on 
summary judgment of underestimating how well an 
employee might perform with accommodations or how 
much the employer's bad faith may have hindered the 
process of finding accommodations. 
 
In Taylor's case we believe that there are genuine 
disputes about the school district's good faith participation 
in the interactive process, and assuming the school district 
did act in bad faith, nothing the school district points to 
demonstrates that it would be impossible to accommodate 
Taylor. Prior to her hospitalization, Taylor performed her 
job effectively for nearly two decades. But after becoming 
disabled and seeking accommodations, she has presented 
evidence that the school district made no response to her 
request and instead increased the difficulty of her job. 
Given the evidence Taylor presents of bad faith on the 
school district's part, we will not decide on summary 
judgment that it would have been fruitless for the school 
district to make some modest and fairly obvious efforts to 
accommodate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
employer would incur process liability. Bad faith can, of course, take 
many different forms, just as negligence can, precluding easy statement 
of a general rule about when bad faith has occurred. However, we believe 
that jurors should be able to distinguish between stonewalling and 
assisting an employee in finding accommodations. The fact that there 
may be some hard cases is hardly unique in law. The Barnett majority's 
last objection was that 29 C.F.R. S 1630(o)(3) only states that it "may be 
necessary" for the employer to engage in an interactive process. But the 
EEOC's interpretive guidelines state that once an employee requests 
accommodations, the employer "must make a reasonable effort to 
determine the appropriate accommodation." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
S 1630.9 at 359. The guidelines continue that in some instances the 
interactive process may not be necessary because it is clear to both 
parties involved what accommodation will work. For example, the 
guidelines explain that an employee in a wheelchair may want her desk 
elevated with blocks so that her wheelchair will slide under. No 
interactive process will be needed here. Id. at 360. The regulation uses 
the phrase "may be necessary," in other words, because sometimes the 
necessary accommodation is obvious. We have also recognized that the 
process is not necessary in cases where accommodation is impossible. 
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In particular, the school district could have increased 
Taylor's job responsibilities more slowly, given more time to 
introduce the computer, or communicated less by formal, 
written reprimands. The EEOC compliance manual for 
psychiatric disorders provides that some adjustments in 
supervisory methods can qualify as legitimate 
accommodations.11 The ADA itself specifically provides that 
reasonable accommodations can include "job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(9)(B). 
 
The fact that Taylor's potential accommodations are 
modest should not encourage us to dismiss Taylor's claim 
on summary judgment on the theory that they would be 
useless; that would have the bizarre implication that the 
more demanding a plaintiff's accommodations were, the 
more likely the plaintiff is to survive summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs who wish to participate in good faith in the 
interactive process are more likely to have scaled back their 
demands and asked for modest accommodations. More 
importantly, we think it is worth remembering that 
sometimes comparatively modest accommodations can reap 
large returns in how well a disabled employee performs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The EEOC compliance manual states that: "Supervisors play a 
central role in achieving effective reasonable accommodations for their 
employees. In some circumstances, supervisors may be able to adjust 
their methods as a reasonable accommodation by, for example, 
communicating assignments, instructions, or training by the medium 
that is most effective for a particular individual (e.g., in writing, in 
conversation, or by electronic mail)." 2 EEOC Compliance Manual, 
Enforcement Guidance for Psychiatric Disabilities, at 26. However, the 
manual continues that "[r]easonable accommodation... does not require 
lowering standards or removing essential functions of the job." Id. at 26, 
n. 62. We would hasten to add that a disabled employee is not entitled 
to a supervisor ideally suited to his or her needs. We held in Gaul, for 
instance, that an employee is not entitled to transfer whenever the 
employee deems that his co-workers are causing him inordinate stress. 
134 F.3d at 579. 
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We want to reiterate the limits of the interactive process. 
We are not holding that an employer who has made a good 
faith effort to accommodate must be saddled with a 
secretary who consistently makes typos and fails to deliver 
messages. Nor do we hold that an employer cannot 
introduce a new computer system or switch an employee to 
a less forgiving supervisor. What we do hold is that an 
employer, having received adequate notice of an employee's 
disability and desire for accommodations, cannot fail to 
engage the employee in the interactive process offinding 
accommodations, increase the disabled employee's job 
responsibilities, and then simply document the employee's 
failures. 
 
To show that an employer failed to participate in the 
interactive process, a disabled employee must demonstrate: 
1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; 2) the 
employee requested accommodations or assistance for his 
or her disability; 3) the employer did not make a good faith 
effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations; 
and 4) the employee could have been reasonably 
accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith. 
Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420; Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285; 
Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165. 
 
We believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Taylor requested accommodations, that the school district 
made no effort to help Taylor find accommodations and was 
responsible for the breakdown in the process, and that 
there were accommodations that the school district could 
have provided that would have made Taylor able to perform 
the essential functions of her job. If a jury concludes that 
the school district was not responsible for the breakdown in 
the interactive process, Taylor must demonstrate that a 
specific, reasonable accommodation would have allowed her 
to perform the essential functions of her job. 
 
We have viewed the evidence in the light most favorable 
to Taylor, as we must on summary judgment. The school 
district is, of course, free on remand to argue that it did not 
receive notice of Taylor's request for accommodation, that it 
tried to assist Taylor in seeking accommodations, or, 
assuming the school district was responsible for the 
breakdown in the process, that no accommodation would 
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have allowed Taylor to perform the essential functions of 
her job.12 
 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the March 20, 
1998 grant of summary judgment by the District Court and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The District Court treated Taylor's case as possibly raising a 
disparate-treatment claim. Because Taylor represents on appeal that she 
did not intend to raise such a claim, we need not reach the issue. 
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